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Summary 
 The vocational employment-training program is the most ambitious 
and expensive amongst the active labor market policy programs for 
the unemployed in Sweden. We analyze its effect on the individual 
transition rate from unemployment to employment using a unique set 
of administrative data and a novel empirical approach exploiting 
variations in the timing of training and exit to work. The approach 
involves estimating  duration models, and it allows us to quantify the 
individual effect of training in the presence of selectivity on unob-
servables. The data contain the full population of unemployed in the 
period 1993-2000 and include multiple unemployment spells for many 
individuals. The results indicate a significantly positive effect on exit 
to work after the program. Its magnitude is very large shortly after 
finishing the course but it then diminishes. If we also take the time 
spent in the program into account, the net effect of participation in 
the program on the mean unemployment duration is close to zero.   
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Training programs for the unemployed have constituted the corner-
stones of the Swedish labor market policy for many decades. In fact, 
such programs have been used since 1918. Nowadays, the so-called 
employment-training program (here simply called the AMU program) 
is the most prestigious. It aims at improving the chances of unem-
ployed job seekers to obtain a job, through courses where their skills 
are substantially improved. In 1997, on average 37,000 individuals per 
month participated in AMU, which corresponds to over 10 percent of 
the total number of unemployed.1 AMU is the most expensive type of 
active labor market program in Sweden and, as such, it adds to the tax 
burden. Nevertheless, the number of evaluational studies is rather 
small, and most of these analyze the effect of AMU on the partici-
pants’ earnings and/or use data from the early eighties and/or data on 
special subgroups of unemployed workers, notably youths in Stock-
holm (see references below).  
This paper empirically analyzes the effect of AMU on the individ-
ual transition rate from unemployment to employment. Note that the 
officially stated objective of AMU is to generate a positive effect and 
the results are of obvious importance for evaluating  the AMU pro-
gram and the underlying “Swedish model”. In addition, they are 
important in the light of recent policy shifts in other European coun-
tries towards an increased use of active measures for returning the 
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for their permission to use the data. We thank Richard Smith, Costas Meghir, Annette Berge-
mann, Håkan Regnér, Anders Harkman, participants at the Conference on Active Labor Mar-
ket Policy (Stockholm, 2001), the Conference on Adult Education (Uppsala, 2001), and semi-
nars at Aarhus, Bristol, and Mannheim, as well as our colleagues at IFAU, for helpful com-
ments. In addition, we thank Helge Bennmarker for help with the data. 
1 In 2000, these figures are 30,000 and 9 percent, respectively (see AMS, 2001). 
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unemployed to work, notably through reschooling unemployed work-
ers with low skills or obsolete qualifications (see e.g. Fay, 1996).  
We use a unique fresh set of longitudinal administrative data 
containing the complete population of unemployed individuals in 
Sweden within the period January 1, 1993 to June 22, 2000. This data-
set matches detailed records from employment offices with records 
from unemployment insurance agencies. The employment office data 
provide detailed information on the types of training and the corre-
sponding dates of entry and exit. A large number of individuals have 
experienced multiple unemployment spells within our observation 
window.  
The empirical analysis applies a methodology where information 
on the timing of events (like the moment when the individual enrolls 
in training and the moment he finds a job) is used to estimate the in-
dividual training effect. This method takes into account that the train-
ing decision and the decision to accept a job are affected by unob-
served factors. If individuals receiving training were to have found a 
job relatively fast anyway, and if this is ignored in the analysis, then 
the training effect on the exit rate to work is over-estimated. Our 
method allows us to distinguish between such selection effects and 
the causal individual training effect. This is a major advantage over 
the use of methods requiring the selection effects to be completely 
captured by observed variables (like the so-called matching approach), 
in particular if the set of variables observed only contains a small 
number of indicators of past individual labor market behavior, as is 
often the case. Another advantage of our approach is that it enables 
an examination of changes in the individual training effect over time 
and  we can learn something about the reasons why training works or 
not. 
The empirical approach involves estimation of models 
simultaneously explaining the duration of unemployment before ob-
taining work or participating in training programs. The approach has 
been used in a number of empirical studies, like Eberwein et al. (1997) 
and Van den Berg et al. (2002) (on training programs), and Abbring et 
al. (1997) (on punitive sanctions for unemployment insurance recipi-
ents; see also Gritz, 1993; and Bonnal et al., 1997, for extensions fo-
cused on training programs; and Van den Berg, 2001, for a survey). 
Abbring and Van den Berg (2000) provide an underpinning of this 
approach, and a systematic account of the behavioral assumptions 
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required for valid use.2 For example, individuals are not allowed to 
anticipate the moment when they go into training a long time in ad-
vance, although they will know the distribution of this moment over 
time. We argue that AMU fits rather well into this methodological 
framework, whereas other active labor market programs in Sweden 
may not. To demonstrate this, we rely to some extent on evidence 
from in-depth interviews with caseworkers, and to some extent on 
existing studies on unemployment, unemployment insurance, and ac-
tive labor market programs in Sweden. These include Eriksson 
(1997a,b), Zettermark et al. (2000), Carling and Richardson (2001), 
Dahlberg and Forslund (1999), Edin et al. (1998), and Carling et al. 
(1996). The latter two studies deal with the interaction between the 
inflow into active labor market programs in general on the one hand, 
and the expiration of benefits entitlement on the other. We return to 
this issue in Sections 1 and 2.  
To date, a few econometric studies have addressed the effect of 
AMU on unemployment duration. Harkman and Johansson (1999) 
and some replication studies examine individuals who finished a pro-
gram in the final quarter of 1996. They use a subset of our  data and 
match it to data from a postal survey conducted in late 1997. 
Harkman and Johansson estimate a bivariate probit model on the 
employment probability, for different programs one year after the end 
of the program. Furthermore, they assume that the composition of 
programs within the employment office affects the individual prob-
ability of program participation, but does not affect the individual 
probability of exit to work. Under this assumption, an observed rela-
 
2 Here we just provide some clarification as to what drives the identification of the 
training effect. Consider individuals who enter training at time t. The natural con-
trol group consists of individuals unemployed for the same period of time at t, but 
who have not yet received training. A necessary condition for a meaningful com-
parison of these groups is that there is some randomization in the training assign-
ment at t. The duration model framework allows for such randomization because it 
specifies assignment by the rate of entering training. In addition, we must deal with 
the selection issue that the unobserved heterogeneity distribution differs between 
the treatment and control groups at t. This can be corrected by exploiting the in-
formation in the data on what happened to individuals who received training 
and/or left unemployment before t. 
Another way of explaining identification emphasizes the importance of the tim-
ing of events. If training and outcome are typically realized very shortly after each 
other, notwithstanding the length of the elapsed duration in the state of interest 
before the training, this is evidence of a positive causal training effect. The selection 
effect does not give rise to the same type of quick succession of events. 
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tion between the composition of programs and the probability of exit 
to work indicates a training effect. However, it is not clear whether 
the assumption is justifiable. Their results indicate that there is a 
higher probability for individuals in AMU to get a job. Subjective re-
sponses to the perceived importance of program participation corre-
spond with the estimation results.3  
Our empirical analyses focus on how the effect on the exit rate to 
work varies over time. For example, we allow this effect to depend on 
the time elapsed in unemployment since exiting the course. We also 
estimate a model taking the real time spent in training into account. 
The latter mitigates any positive effect of training, in the sense that 
the time in training in itself increases the mean duration of unem-
ployment. In addition, we estimate models where the training effects 
depend on gender, nationality, and level of education.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the AMU 
program. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the model framework and 
we argue that AMU fits into it. The technical details are relegated to 
the appendix. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 contains the 
main estimation results. Section 5 concludes.  
1. Swedish labor market training  
1.1. The AMU program 
The purpose of the AMU program is to improve the chances for job 
seekers of obtaining a job, and making it easier for employers to find 
workers with suitable skills. The aim is to increase unemployed indi-
 
3 Edin and Holmlund (1991) and Larsson (2000) examine the effect of AMU on the 
transition rate from unemployment to work for young individuals aged below 25. 
Edin and Holmlund (1991) use data from Stockholm from the early 1980s. They 
compare the unemployment spells of individuals who become unemployed and do 
not enter the program with the unemployment spells after exiting an AMU-
program, and they attempt to deal with selectivity by adding several variables in the 
individual’s unemployment history. They find a positive effect. Larsson (2000) also 
uses a matching approach with data from the 1990s. Her results are mixed. We do 
not examine these studies further; in our empirical analyses, we restrict the atten-
tion to individuals aged over 25 (see Subsection 2.2). See Björklund (1993) for a 
survey of other studies based on data from the 1970s and 1980s. Regnér (2002) 
analyses earnings effects of AMU using data from around the 1980s. A matching 
approach is used to construct a comparison group. He concludes that, on average, 
there is no effect of AMU on earnings. 
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viduals’ transition rate to work, which is achieved by the participation 
of individuals in training and educational courses.4 
The program is targeted at unemployed as well as employed indi-
viduals running the risk of becoming unemployed. The individuals 
must be registered at the local job center (which we shall call the (lo-
cal) employment office) and must be actively searching for a job. The 
lower age limit is 20, although younger individuals are nowadays enti-
tled to participate if they are disabled or receive unemployment insur-
ance (UI) benefits.  
During the 1980s, the yearly average number of individuals in 
AMU was about 40,000 per month. During the large Swedish reces-
sion of the early 1990s, this number increased to 85,000, with sea-
sonal peaks of about 100,000 participants. After 1992, this number 
once more decreased to about 30,000-40,000, which is about 1 per-
cent of the total labor force (Dahlberg and Forslund, 1999; AMU, 
2001). Nowadays, the annual inflow into AMU is about 80,000. The 
average duration of a course has fluctuated during the past decade 
and is now about six to seven months. In 1994, total expenditure on 
the AMU program amounted to about SEK 12 billion (USD 1.2 bil-
lion), half of which was for training procurement and half for training 
grants. This equals about USD 10,000 for procurement and USD 
10,000 for grants per participant, on a yearly base (AMS, 1997).  
There is strong evidence that in 1991 and 1992, participation in 
AMU was often used to extend benefits entitlement (Regnér, 2002: 
and Edin et al., 1998). This requires a brief exposition. A commonly 
recognized problem with Swedish labor market programs is that they 
are used to extend an individual’s entitlement to unemployment bene-
fits (300 working days (≈ 14 months) for those aged between 25 and 
55). By participating in a program, the unemployed individual ensures 
that his benefits entitlement is extended until the completion of the 
program; in fact, if the program runs over more than a few months, 
the new entitlement extends further into the future. Edin et al. (1998) 
examine this interaction between inflow into active labor market pro-
grams in general on the one hand, and the expiration of benefits enti-
tlement on the other, but do not consider differences across pro-
grams. They find that many unemployed workers move into programs 
 
4 See e.g. AMS (1997). The formulation of the official aims of AMU has changed 
somewhat over time. For example, earlier formulations sometimes even refer to the 
prevention of cyclical inflationary wage increases. See e.g. Harkman and Johansson 
(1999) and Regnér (1997). 
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shortly before expiration. Carling et al. (1996) use data from 1991-
1992 to study these issues, and they reach similar conclusions.5 In 
January 1993, a new large program called ALU (“work experience 
scheme”) was introduced to end the abuse of AMU for benefits enti-
tlement extension. ALU is specifically targeted at individuals whose 
benefits entitlements expire. Participation usually amounts to per-
forming tasks in the non-profit private sector that would otherwise 
not be carried out. In 1993, the size of other non-AMU programs also 
increased, and other new programs were designed. Once more, these 
programs are much cheaper than AMU.  
There are two types of AMU training: vocational and non-
vocational. Vocational training courses are provided by educational 
companies, universities, and municipal consultancy operations. The 
local employment office or the county employment board pay these 
organizations for providing the courses. The aim should be an up-
grading or acquisition of skills that are or are expected to be in short 
supply. In recent years, most courses have concerned computer skills, 
technical skills, manufacturing skills, and skills in services and medical 
health care. Vocational training is not supposed to involve mastering 
a wholly different occupation with a large set of new skills.  
Non-vocational training (basic general training) means participat-
ing in courses within the regular educational system, i.e. at adult edu-
cational centers and universities. Non-vocational training specifically 
aims at preparing the individual for other types of training (the goal of 
an increased transition rate to work is thus less direct). Before 1997, a 
substantial part of AMU consisted of non-vocational training. In 
1997, a new program of adult education (called the Adult Education 
Initiative, or Knowledge Lift) was introduced which is, amongst other 
things, supposed to replace the non-vocational training part of AMU 
(see Brännäs, 2000). Nevertheless, since January 1995, non-vocational 
training amounts to approximately 40 percent of all AMU courses. 
For 2000, this number is even higher (about 50 percent).  
Concerning UI, it should be mentioned that entitlement also re-
quires registration at the employment office. In the mid-1990s, about 
40 percent of the inflow into unemployment and about 65 percent of 
 
5 Note that this also suggests that workers do not enjoy training a great deal, since 
they would otherwise have entered these programs earlier. Alternatively, casework-
ers may have stimulated unemployed individuals to enter programs only shortly 
before the benefits expiration, or program participation was quantity constrained 
for individuals with low unemployment durations. 
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the stock of unemployed qualified for UI (Carling et al., 2001). Part of 
the remaining 60 percent received “cash assistance” benefits, which 
are typically much lower than UI benefits. The average replacement 
rate for UI recipients is about 75 percent (Carling et al., 2001).  
During the training, the participants’ income is called a training 
grant. Those entitled to UI receive a grant equal to their UI benefits 
level, with a minimum of SEK 240 per day (about USD 24). The 
other participants receive a grant of SEK 143 per day. These pay-
ments are made by the UI agency. In case of vocational training, the 
training organizations must submit attendance reports, and the grant 
is withheld in case of non-attendance. In all cases, training is free of 
charge. In fact, additional benefits are available to cover the costs of 
literature, technical equipment, travel, and hotel accommodation. In 
this sense, AMU training is far more attractive than regular education.  
In Sweden, there is a number of other active labor market pro-
grams (that is, apart from AMU and the above-mentioned ALU). 
Most of these concern subsidized employment. See AMS (1998) and 
Harkman and Johansson (1999) for descriptions of programs and 
changes in program participation over time, respectively. In 1997, on 
average 191,000 individuals (4.5 percent of the total labor force) par-
ticipated in one of the programs. The government’s part of the total 
costs has exceeded 3 percent of GDP (Dahlberg and Forslund, 1999, 
Regnér, 1997). In fact, Sweden has been the country with the highest 
percentage of GDP spending on active labor market policies in the 
world.  
The benefits entitlement rules and programs for persons aged be-
low 25 or above 55 differ from those aged between 25 and 55. Young 
persons must participate in a program after 100 days of unemploy-
ment, otherwise they lose their unemployment benefits. They may use 
special programs not available for other age groups. Persons above 55 
receive unemployment benefits for 450 days (instead of 300 days for 
those aged between 25 and 55).  
Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) examine crowding out of non-
participants by active labor market programs, but they find no signifi-
cant crowding out effects of AMU.  
1.2. Decisions at the micro level 
In this subsection, we describe the process that leads to an individ-
ual’s enrolment in AMU. The information is mostly from documents 
from the Swedish National Labour Market Board (AMS) (see e.g. 
THE EFFECT OF VOCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT TRAINING,  
Katarina Richardson and Gerard J. van den Berg 
184 
AMS, 1998) and in-depth interviews with a number of individual 
caseworkers.6 In addition, we rely on Zettermark et al. (2000), who 
provide a wealth of information on the day-to-day activities of em-
ployment offices and caseworkers. Most of that information confirms 
the results from the interviews.  
Usually the employment offices advertise  the availability of AMU 
courses at the office and in the newspapers. Most of them advertise 
one or two months before the scheduled starting date and they invite 
those interested to an information meeting. At this meeting, the indi-
viduals are informed about the contents of the course and the eligibil-
ity rules. The personal caseworkers are usually also available at the 
meeting. Those who are interested can then apply to the course.  
Enrolment requires approval from the caseworker. The eligibility 
rules usually include minimum requirements as concerns the educa-
tional level. However, most courses are at a fairly basic level, so these 
requirements are not very restrictive. The caseworker also estimates 
the individual’s “need” for AMU. In practice, this means that he ex-
amines whether the individual’s skills can be enhanced by the course. 
It is common that applicants undergo a test to determine whether 
they will benefit from the course. One may, for example, test the skills 
in mathematics or the Swedish language and there may also be some 
ability testing. Another way of determining whether the individual’s 
skills can be enhanced is by examining his “expected” unemployment 
duration, which is considered to be high in case of a low or an obso-
lete type of education, or if the individual has an occupation in excess 
supply. This type of “profiling” is subjective. Sometimes, the appli-
cant should write a personal letter explaining why he wishes to par-
ticipate in a specific AMU-course. If the person has work experience 
in the relevant occupation, the caseworker might call employer refer-
ences to ask if they would consider employing the person after the 
AMU. In general, caseworkers seem to be reluctant to offer an AMU 
course in a field that is completely different from the  individual’s 
original occupation. If an individual rejects a caseworker’s offer of an 
AMU course, his unemployment benefits may, in principle, be com-
pletely cut off, but this does not seem to happen in practice.  
Occasionally, caseworkers may work closely with firms requiring 
certain skill categories. These firms may have an influence on who is 
 
6 We did not use a formal sampling procedure to select caseworkers for interviews. 
Rather, we contacted a number of them to get detailed information on the actual 
decision process at the work floor of the employment offices. 
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accepted in the program. Training (of the unemployed individual) and 
job search effort (done by his caseworker) may go hand in hand, so 
that the effect of AMU may consist of a skill enhancing as well as a 
search effort effect.  
If the number of applicants is insufficient, the course may be can-
celed (i.e. may not be bought from the course provider). If there are 
more applicants than slots in a given course, individuals with high 
elapsed durations and/or at risk of losing benefits (these are usually 
the same individuals) are often given priority. However, AMU is gen-
erally not offered to individuals primarily concerned about the re-
newal of their unemployment benefits. It is commonly felt that such 
practices would not agree with the objective of AMU. Perhaps more 
importantly, there are in general cheaper alternative programs for 
dealing with such cases, like workfare programs, and efforts are in-
stead made to push the individual into those programs. Similarly, 
AMU is generally not offered to individuals who, in the  caseworker’s 
opinion, need practical experience in order to be able to get a job, or 
just “need something to do”. In such cases, the individual is offered 
another active labor market program, like a work experience program.  
There is approximately one month between the first information 
meeting and the first day of the course. On average, the period from 
application to acceptance is 2-3 weeks, while the period from accep-
tance to the start of the course is 1-2 weeks. An individual may try the 
AMU-course before actually starting the course. For example, if he is 
interested in welding, he can make a one-week visit to the school 
offering welding courses. Further, individuals may drop out of the 
course, because they find a job or for other reasons. In fact, in the 
first case, they are encouraged to do so, and they can come back later 
and complete the course. An AMU participant may also follow a se-
quence of courses, starting with basic vocational training and ending 
in a very narrow type of vocational training. Such a sequence may take 
30-40 weeks. The participants do not receive grades or test-based cer-
tificates upon finishing a course.  
We now show that the above information given by caseworkers on 
the process leading to an individual’s enrolment in AMU is confirmed 
by existing empirical studies. Eriksson (1997a,b) analyzes choice and 
selection into different programs using the HÄNDEL data in combi-
nation with survey data on choice and selection by the unemployed as 
well as the caseworkers. The HÄNDEL data also constitute the major 
administrative data set for our own analyses. It is shown that the per-
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sonal characteristics observable in HÄNDEL cannot give a very pre-
cise prediction of actual participation in AMU versus non-
participation. The predictive performance can be substantially en-
hanced if accounting for self-reported (by the unemployed) measures 
of the extent to which AMU is expected to have certain advantages 
for future labor market prospects. These can be assumed to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity in the inflow rate into AMU and perhaps 
unobserved heterogeneity in the treatment effect. (Naturally, they may 
also reflect an ex-post rationalization of actual choices in the past.) 
Eriksson (1997a) notes that informal interviews with caseworkers re-
veal that the motivation of the unemployed is a very important crite-
rion for placing an unemployed individual in AMU.  
Eriksson (1997b) exploits survey data obtained by letting case-
workers give AMU-advice on the basis of actual files of unemployed 
individuals supplied by the survey agency. The allocation of files to 
caseworkers is completely random. The data also allow for a compari-
son between the valuation of AMU as stated by the caseworkers and 
the actual (non-) participation of the individual. It turns out that the 
heterogeneity of caseworkers (which is typically unobserved but is 
here observed and used as an identifier) is a more important determi-
nant of the caseworkers’ stated decisions than the unobserved hetero-
geneity of the unemployed individuals as captured by fixed effects. 
Thus, there is a great deal of variation in the caseworkers’ decisions 
which cannot be attributed to the unemployed individuals’ identities 
but to the caseworkers’ identities. When making selections on the ba-
sis of observable personal characteristics, officials seem to use rules of 
thumb which are often not in accordance with the stated goals of 
AMU on priority groups. If the caseworkers consider that an individ-
ual would benefit a great deal from participation, the individual is also 
more likely to be an actual participant. But the actual participation 
also depends on the unemployed individual and unexplained factors.  
Carling and Richardson (2001) use the HÄNDEL data from 1995 
and onwards to study the choice of a particular type of training pro-
gram conditional on entering one of these programs. They use a Mul-
tinomial Logit model and they find that employment agency identifi-
ers have significant effects, which dominate the effects of the charac-
teristics of the unemployed individual.  
According to Eriksson (1997b), caseworkers are reluctant to let 
current participants in non-AMU programs enter AMU. Further, 
work experience programs and public temporary employment are 
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substitutes for each other, but not for AMU. Caseworkers consider 
AMU to be a fundamentally different kind of program. Thus, the 
variation in the caseworkers’ behavior with respect to AMU mostly 
concerns the choice between AMU and no AMU, instead of the 
choice between AMU and another program. According to Dahlberg 
and Forslund (1999), AMU is nowadays typically not used for UI enti-
tlement extensions.  
2. The model framework 
2.1. A class of bivariate duration models for treatment  
evaluation 
We normalize the point in time when the individual enters unem-
ployment to zero. Durations Tu and Tp measure the duration until 
employment and the duration until entry into the AMU training pro-
gram, respectively. At this stage, we assume that unemployment can 
only end in employment, and we consider the period in AMU as part 
of the unemployment spell. At the moment, we also ignore time spent 
in other training programs. As a result, Tu also denotes the duration of 
unemployment. The population considered concerns the inflow into 
unemployment.  
We assume that the individual distribution of Tp can vary with the 
observed and unobserved explanatory variables x and vp, respectively. 
Similarly, we assume that the individual distribution of Tu can vary 
with the observed and unobserved explanatory variables x and vu and 
the realized value of Tp of that individual. To construct a model, it is 
useful to focus on the hazard rates of Tp, given x,vp and Tu, given x,vu,Tp. 
The hazard rate of a duration variable is the rate at which the spell is 
completed at time t, given that it has not previously been completed, 
as a function of t. It provides a full characterization of the duration 
distribution (see Lancaster, 1990; and Van den Berg, 2001). Somewhat 
loosely, this is the speed at which the duration is realized.7 We the use 
notations θp(t|x,vp) and θu(t|Tp,x,vu), respectively. We do not require 
 
7 For a nonnegative random (duration) variable T, the hazard rate is defined as θ(t) 
= limdt↓0 Pr(T ∈[t,t+dt)T ≥ t)/dt. Consider the distribution of a duration variable 
conditional on some other variables. It is customary to use a vertical “conditioning 
line” within the argument of a hazard rate to distinguish between (on the left-hand 
side) the value of the duration variable at which the hazard rate is evaluated, and 
(on the right-hand side) the variables conditioned upon. 
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that vp=vu, but we allow them to be dependent. The variable x may be 
different in θp and θu.  
As noted in the introduction, we are interested in the causal effect 
of participation in AMU on the exit from unemployment. Treatment 
and exit are characterized by the moments when they occur, so we are 
interested in the effect of the realization of Tp on the distribution of 
Tu. We assume that the realization tp of Tp affects the shape of the 
hazard of Tu from tp onwards, in a deterministic way. This assumption 
implies that the causal effect is captured by the effect of Tp on 
θu(t|Tp,x,vu) for t > Tp. We adopt the following specification of hazard 
rates θu(t|tp,x,vu) and θp(t|x,vp),  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ppppp vxtvxt ⋅′⋅= βλθ exp,  
 
(1) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) upTtIpuuupu vxTtxtvxTt ⋅⋅′⋅= >,exp,, δβλθ  (2) 
 
where I(.) denotes the indicator function, which is 1 if its argument is 
true and 0 otherwise.  
Apart from the term involving δ(t|Tp,x), the above hazard rates 
have Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) specifications. The function 
λi(t) is called the “baseline hazard”, since it gives the shape of the haz-
ard rate θi for any given individual. The hazard rate is said to be dura-
tion dependent if its value changes over t. Positive (negative) duration 
dependence means that λi(t) increases (decreases). The term exp(x´βi) 
is called the “systematic part” of the hazard. Finally, the term vi is 
called the “unobserved heterogeneity term”. MPH models are the 
universally most popular reduced-form duration models in economet-
rics (see Van den Berg, 2001, for a survey).  
The term ( )pTtIp xTt >),(δ  captures the AMU effect. Clearly, AMU 
has no effect if and only if δ(t|Tp,x) ≡ 1. Now, suppose that δ(t|Tp,x) is 
equal to a constant larger than one. If Tp is realized, the level of the 
individual exit rate to employment increases by a fixed amount, which 
will reduce the remaining unemployment duration in comparison to 
the case where the individuals enter AMU at a later point in time. In 
more general, we allow the effect of AMU to vary with the moment 
Tp of entry into AMU and x. Moreover, the individual effect may also 
vary over time, as we allow it to depend on the elapsed unemploy-
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ment duration, t. As a result, the individual effect may also vary with  
time t−Tp, since entry into AMU (in fact, in the empirical analysis we 
only consider the variation of the effect with t−Tp and not with t or Tp 
separately). The effect of t−Tp may capture the fact that the exit rate is 
low during the training course or high immediately after participation. 
We return to the details of this below.  
The AMU effect cannot be inferred from a direct comparison of 
realized unemployment durations of individuals with a given Tp with 
the realized unemployment durations of other individuals. If the indi-
viduals entering AMU at tp have relatively short unemployment dura-
tions, this might be for two reasons: (1) the individual causal AMU 
effect is positive, or (2) these individuals have relatively high values of 
vu and would have found a job relatively fast anyway. The second rela-
tion is a spurious selection effect. If this is ignored, the estimate of the 
AMU effect may be inconsistent.  
Recall that the same vector x may affect both hazards and that we 
allow for the possibility that vu=vp. This means that we allow individu-
als to be aware of the existence of AMU, and we allow them to influ-
ence both the rate of entry into AMU and the rate of exit into em-
ployment. We do not assume that we observe determinants of train-
ing assignment that the individual does not use himself to update his 
strategy. Furthermore, it should be noted that we may allow x to vary 
over time.  
The data provide observations on Tu and x. In addition, if Tp is 
completed before the realization of Tu then we also observe the reali-
zation of Tp, otherwise we merely observe that Tp exceeds Tu. In addi-
tion, the data provide multiple spells, i.e. we may observe more than 
one unemployment spell for individuals in the sample. We assume 
that an individual has a given time-invariant value of (vu,vp) and that, 
given these values and x, the spells of an individual are independent. 
Since vu and vp are unobserved, the duration variables given x are not 
independent across spells. Intuitively, it is plausible that the larger the 
number of individuals with multiple spells in the data, the less sensi-
tive the results are with respect to the assumptions underlying the 
model framework. Basically, with multi-spell data, the empirical set-
ting is similar to a standard panel data analysis with fixed effects. It 
should be emphasized that this requires the assumption that the un-
observed explanatory variables do not vary across spells. In reality, 
these variables may change between two consecutive unemployment 
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spells, for example because of the accumulation of specific types of 
work experience.  
A number of assumptions are implicitly captured by the model 
specification. First of all, according to the model, the realization of 
entry into AMU training at say tp does not have an effect on the indi-
vidual’s exit rate, θu, prior to that moment, tp. The individual’s exit rate 
at t is the same irrespective of whether training will occur at t+1 or at 
t+100. This basically rules out the anticipatory effects of the training. 
If an individual does anticipate participation in AMU at a particular 
future date tp, he may want to wait for the training by reducing his 
search intensity for jobs, i.e. he may change strategies which may de-
crease the probability that Tu is quickly realized. If this is ignored in 
the empirical analysis, the training effect may be over-estimated. 
However, if the time span between the moment when the anticipation 
occurs and the actual training is short relative to durations Tp and 
Tu−Tp, and if the anticipatory effect is not very large, then the estima-
tion results may be rather insensitive to the assumption of no antici-
pation.  
With well-established programs like AMU, it is plausible that the 
determinants of the training assignment affect the individual’s exit rate 
from unemployment before his actual entry into training. For example, 
at any time before participation in AMU, unemployed workers may 
search less because they know that there is a probability that their 
skills can be enhanced by AMU at some point during unemployment. 
In that case, the program is said to have an ex ante effect on exit from 
unemployment. Such an effect should not be confused with anticipat-
ing the realization of entry into training, because in the latter case, the 
individual knows the stochastic outcome rather than the determinants 
of the process. Likewise, the lack of anticipation does not mean that 
ex ante effects of AMU are ruled out.  
The ex ante effect can be contrasted with the ex post effect of train-
ing, which is the effect of actual training on the individual exit rate—
the effect we focus on in this paper. Thus, the ex ante effect is an ex-
ample of the macro effects in a world where a particular program is 
implemented. There may also be ex ante or macro effects on the 
magnitude and composition of the inflow into unemployment and the 
behavior of employers. We do not estimate the ex ante effects of 
AMU, but the model is compatible with such effects. Individuals may 
know the determinants of the process leading to training, including 
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the probability distribution of the duration until training, but they do 
not know the outcome of this process in advance.  
A different type of anticipation occurs if the future realization of 
the variable of interest Tu has an effect on the current level of θp. In 
reality, an individual may have private knowledge of a future job op-
portunity that is independent of whether training will occur, and he 
may use this knowledge to avoid training. However, the model speci-
fication rules out that individuals anticipate the future outcome of Tu 
and use this to modify their strategy which, in turn, would affect the 
rate at which entry into training occurs. If something similar occurs in 
reality and is ignored in the model, then a positive effect of training 
on exit to employment is under-estimated. On the other hand, if the 
training course spans over a long period of time, such an effect may 
be unimportant, as employers may be unwilling to wait for a new em-
ployee for several months. If the time span between the moment of 
anticipation and the moment of the actual exit to work is relatively 
short, and if the anticipatory effect is not very large, the estimation 
results may be rather insensitive to this. Once more, lack of anticipa-
tion does not rule out that individuals know the determinants of the 
process leading to employment and use these as inputs in their deci-
sion problem. For example, individuals may know that λu(t) increases 
in the near future, and modify their strategy accordingly, which may 
affect their θp. The latter can be captured in the model by λp(t).  
A more technical aspect of the model specification follows from 
the fact that we specify the assignment of training by specifying the 
hazard rate of a duration distribution. This approach implies that 
there is a random component in the assignment that is independent 
of all other variables (see e.g. Ridder, 1990; and Abbring and Van den 
Berg, 2000). This resembles the role of the error term in a regression 
equation. Intuitively, it is clear that if there is not much variation in 
the moment of entry into AMU, it is difficult to address its effect. In 
the extreme case where individuals can only enter AMU, say, exactly 
one year after flowing into unemployment, it is impossible to distin-
guish any effect of AMU from the duration dependence effect on the 
exit rate to work. In that case, it is also impossible to justify that entry 
into AMU is not anticipated.  
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2.2. Applicability of the model framework to AMU 
In this subsection, we argue that the above model is particularly well 
suited for our study of the AMU program. We focus on the following 
issues: dependent (unobserved) heterogeneity, randomness in the 
(moment of) treatment assignment, absence of anticipatory effects, 
and absence of substitution with other programs.  
From the information in Subsection 1.2 and the studies by Eriks-
son (1997a,b), it is obvious that unobserved (to us) heterogeneity of 
unemployed individuals plays an important role in the assignment to 
AMU. The corresponding variables taken into account by the case-
worker (like motivation, subjectively assessed expected unemploy-
ment duration, and subjective assessments of other aspects of the in-
dividual’s future career) are also indications of unobserved determi-
nants of the individual exit rate to work. The empirical analysis should 
therefore take potentially related unobserved heterogeneity terms in θu 
and θp  into account.  
If the individual knows that a variable is an important determinant 
of treatment assignment (like the amount and type of discretionary 
behavior of his caseworker), and he knows that he may be subject to 
treatment, then he has a strong incentive to question the actual value 
of the variable. Subsequently, he will take his value of the variable into 
account when determining his optimal strategy which, in turn, affects 
the rate at which he moves to employment. The variables observed by 
us and that may have an effect on assignment to AMU are also ob-
servable to the individuals under consideration. Therefore, we allow 
the same set of x variables to affect θp and θu.  
Now, let us consider the presence of randomness in the moment 
of entry into AMU. To some extent, this may be generated by 
changes in the behavior of the caseworker or the employment agency 
that are beyond the observation window of the unemployed individ-
ual. More importantly, this is generated by the variation in the mo-
ment when AMU courses start. In addition, admission to a course 
may depend on the extent to which other individuals apply to the 
course, which is random from the individual’s point of view. Recall 
that Eriksson (1997b) finds residual variation in the AMU assignment 
process that can not be attributed to the individual or the caseworker.  
We now turn to the anticipation of the moment of entry into 
AMU. From Subsection 1.2, the time period between the moment 
when the individual is informed about the possibility of enrolling in 
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an AMU course and when the course starts is very short. (Naturally, 
we allow individuals to be aware of the existence of the AMU pro-
gram.) There are, however, two reasons why individuals may anticipate 
the moment of entry, both of which make us restrict the scope of the 
empirical analysis somewhat.  
First, as shown in Section 1, AMU was often used to extend bene-
fits entitlement in 1991 and 1992. In that case, the date of inflow into 
AMU is mainly determined by the date of expiration of the benefits 
entitlement. The latter date is known in advance by the unemployed 
individual and his caseworker (this date does not vary much across 
the unemployed; see the references). This allows for anticipating the 
inflow into AMU, which violates a key assumption of our empirical 
methodology. Moreover, such self-selection into AMU is governed by 
different motives than self-selection in other years, so that we may 
expect the unobserved heterogeneity distribution to differ over time. 
From January 1993 and onwards, other programs took over its role as 
a means of extending benefits entitlement. We therefore restrict the 
attention to data from 1993 and onwards.  
Second, recall from Section 1 that part of AMU concerns non-
vocational training (in particular before 1997) which primarily aims at 
preparing the individual for other types of training. It is often given 
within the regular school system and implies that the starting date of 
the non-vocational training is often determined by institutional fea-
tures of the school system, like the starting dates of the school terms. 
As a result, it is easy for an unemployed individual to anticipate the 
date of inflow into such a program and we therefore restrict ourselves 
to vocational training. There are actually two other reasons for this. 
First, vocational training is relatively expensive and second, it is diffi-
cult to get in other programs, whereas non-vocational training is eas-
ier to get elsewhere, so that in the latter case there are substitution 
possibilities.  
Concerning substitution possibilities, recall from Subsection 1.2 
that caseworkers regard vocational AMU training as a very different 
type of program than other active labor market programs. The latter 
are regarded to be substitutable to a high degree. For persons below 
25, there are programs that are more similar to AMU vocational train-
ing. Further, the similarity with courses and tracks in the regular 
school system may be important for these individuals. For this reason, 
we restrict the attention to individuals over 25. Young individuals 
must also enter a training course after 100 days of unemployment, 
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which may generate anticipatory effects. We omit individuals over 55 
because they face a different unemployment benefits system and 
vocational AMU training seems to have relatively small advantages for 
them.  
It follows from the above that our model framework may be less 
suited for the analysis of the effects of other active labor market pro-
grams on unemployment duration. For other programs, individuals 
may anticipate their enrolment a long time in advance, because of 
their link to benefits entitlement expiration and/or because of their 
connection to the regular school system. Moreover, it is difficult to 
analyze them in isolation because of the high degree of substitutabil-
ity.  
3. The data 
The data are based on a combination of the administrative data sets 
called HÄNDEL (from the official employment offices) and 
AKSTAT (from the unemployment insurance fund). For the present 
project HÄNDEL , which contains information on unemployed indi-
viduals’ training activities and work experience activities, is the most 
important source. These data cover all registered unemployed persons 
since August 1991 (approximately 2 million observations), and they 
contain detailed information on the types of training as well as the 
starting and ending dates of participation in the program. According 
to Carling et al. (2001), more than 90 percent of the individuals who 
are ILO-unemployed8 according to labor force surveys also register at 
the employment offices. The AKSTAT data are available from 1994 
and onwards and provide information on the wage level and working 
hours in the employment prior to the spell of unemployment, for in-
dividuals eligible for UI. The full HÄNDEL data are also informative 
on whether an individual in AMU obtains vocational or non-
vocational training.  
Our observation window runs from January 1, 1993 until June 22, 
2000. The unit of observation is one individual. For each individual 
who appears in HÄNDEL at least once during the observation win-
dow, we can construct an event history from the HÄNDEL data. For 
the spells of unemployment (to be defined below), the information in 
 
8 The unemployment definition of the ILO (International Labour Organization) 
states that the individual must be without employment, actively searching for em-
ployment, and currently available for employment. 
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HÄNDEL and AKSTAT is used to make a list of characteristics at 
the beginning of the spell, and a list of dates when changes occur, in-
cluding the nature of the change. It is particularly important to in-
clude information on participation in non-AMU programs, since such 
participation may rule out a transition to AMU, or may at least reduce 
the transition rate to AMU and/or work.  
We only use information on individuals who become unemployed 
at least once within the observation window. An individual becomes 
unemployed on the first date when he registers at the employment 
office as being “openly” unemployed. This eliminates registration 
spells that start because the individual wants to change employers and 
also eliminates spells that start because the individual knows that he is 
going to be unemployed in the future (short-term contract or notifica-
tion of lay-off), at least until the individual actually becomes unem-
ployed. We also ignore unemployment spells that have already stated 
at the beginning of the observation window, because using these 
would force us to make assumptions about the inflow rate before the 
beginning of the window. We thus obtain a so-called inflow sample of 
unemployment spells, and we follow the corresponding individual 
over time after this moment of inflow. (Note that we also use infor-
mation available on the period prior to such spells, notably on wages.) 
In addition, we exclude individuals who have experienced unemploy-
ment between August 1991 and January 1, 1993. August 1991 is the 
first month for which we have information on the individual’s labor 
market state. The behavior of individuals who have been unemployed 
shortly before January 1993 may differ from that of those who have 
not.  
For convenience, we use the term unemployment spell to include 
possible spells in AMU, relief work, ALU, etc. The spell ends if the 
individual leaves the employment office register or if he moves from 
the unemployment categories in the employment office register to a 
non-unemployment category. If the exit destination is employment, 
we observe a realization of the duration variable of interest. If the exit 
destination is different (e.g. “regular education”, or “other reason”), 
this duration variable is right-censored. The duration is independently 
right-censored if the spell continues at the end of the observation 
window. If exit occurs into “wage subsidy” or “(public) sheltered em-
ployment”, we remove the individual from the sample, since these 
programs are for handicapped people (who are typically not in open 
unemployment anyway). As a result, our data set contains 500,960 
THE EFFECT OF VOCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT TRAINING,  
Katarina Richardson and Gerard J. van den Berg 
196 
individuals. Note that  following  individuals over time, we may ob-
serve multiple unemployment spells per individual.  
Occasionally, we observe coding errors in the data at points in 
time when individuals move between different categories in the regis-
ter. Obvious typing errors are corrected, whereas otherwise, we right-
censor the duration variables at the moment when such an error oc-
curs.  
If we treated participation in other programs before participation 
in AMU as regular unemployment, the transition rate from unem-
ployment into AMU would be extremely low during  participation in 
the other programs. Participation in non-AMU programs most likely 
also reduces the transition rate into employment, so that  it may be 
preferable to halt the timing of the duration until regular employment, 
during such a period of program participation. As our baseline as-
sumption, the time spent in training (in non-AMU programs as well 
as in AMU) does thus not contribute to the unemployment duration, 
and the time spent in other training programs does not contribute to 
the duration until AMU. Note that this also means that time spent in 
non-AMU programs after AMU does not contribute to the unem-
ployment duration. We address these assumptions in sensitivity analy-
ses.  
As mentioned in Subsection 2.2, we restrict the attention to indi-
viduals who were at least 25 and below 55 when entering unemploy-
ment.  
We distinguish between the following levels of education: junior 
high school or lower, short senior high school, long senior high 
school, short tertiary education, and long university degree or higher. 
These are roughly equivalent to ≤ 9, 10-11, 12-13, 14, and ≥ 15 years 
of education, respectively. As concerns nationality, we also distinguish 
between three categories: Eastern Europe, Africa/Asia, and others 
(including Sweden). As concerns the type of unemployment benefits 
received during unemployment, we distinguish between three catego-
ries: UI, cash allowance, and neither. For UI recipients in 1994 and 
onwards, the AKSTAT data contain the hourly wage earned in the 
employment held just before the onset of the spell of unemployment. 
This is almost linearly related to their UI level (see e.g. Carling et al., 
2001). For non-UI-recipients, the wage variable is set to zero. This is 
also done for UI recipients who become unemployed and subse-
quently employed within 1993. However, if they return to unemploy-
ment in 1994, we use the corresponding pre-unemployment wage as a 
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proxy of the pre-unemployment wage for the unemployment spell in 
1993. 
The analyses are based on a 1 percent random subsample of the 
full data set at our disposal. For each individual, we include three un-
employment spells at most. This results in 5010 individuals with, in 
total, 8656 unemployment spells. We allow the x variables to differ 
across the spells of a given individual. For example, age and the pre-
unemployment wage differ across different spells.  
656 of these spells contain a period of participation in an AMU 
course, and exactly 8000 do not. Some of the latter are naturally right-
censored due to the finiteness of the observation window, so in reality 
some of them may include AMU participation afterwards. The me-
dian Tp across the 656 spells observed to include participation is 161 
days. Table 1 provides some summary statistics. The table takes 
Tp:=Tm if Tp is not realized.  
27 percent of the 656 spells observed to include AMU participa-
tion are also observed to include participation in another type of ac-
tive labor market program before participating in the AMU program. 
Not surprisingly, this predominantly occurs in long spells with a high 
realized value of Tp. Only 12 percent of the 328 spells with Tp smaller 
than its median of 161 days, are also observed to contain participation 
in another type of active labor market program before AMU partici-
pation. 18 percent of the 8000 spells not observed to include partici-
pation at AMU, are observed to contain participation in another type 
of active labor market program. If we restrict the focus to spells with 
Tu smaller than 161 days, this figure drops to 10 percent. Participation 
in other programs does thus not seem to be related to participation in 
AMU. Spells with AMU participation relatively often also contain par-
ticipation in other programs , since by conditioning on AMU partici-
pation we condition on high realized durations.9 
 
 
9 More information on how the data set is constructed is available in an appendix 
available on request. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for the 1 percent sample 
 All spells No AMU With AMU 
Individual characteristics:    
log(age) 3.54 (.23) 3.54 (.23) 3.58 (.22) 
short senior high school .26 .26 .29 
senior high school .20 .20 .20 
short tertiary education .05 .05 .05 
university .16 .16 .14 
female .50 .50 .44 
UI recipient .67 .68 .70 
cash allowance recipient .07 .07 .09 
from Eastern Europe .05 .05 .08 
from Africa, Asia or S. America .05 .05 .05 
log (hourly wage) 2.69 (2.31) 2.66 (2.32) 3.05 (2.14) 
experience in occupation (dummy) .64 .63 .71 
education in occupation (dummy) .62 .61 .65 
professional and technical work .15 .15 .14 
health, nursing and social work care .14 .15 .09 
adm., manag. and clerical work etc. .13 .12 .18 
sales .11 .11 .11 
agriculture and mining .07 .07 .08 
services (incl. not categorized occ.) .17 .17 .15 
large city (dummy) .52 .53 .45 
needs guidance (dummy) .08 .07 .14 
willing to move (dummy) .15 .15 .18 
accepts part time work (dummy) .05 .06 .03 
fraction of spells that starts in:     
1993  .19 .19 .27 
1994 .16 .16 .21 
1995 .16 .15 .20 
1996 .13 .13 .10 
1997 .12 .12 .09 
1998 .11 .11 .09 
1999 .09 .10 .03 
2000 .04 .05 .01 
Observed labor market outcomes    
spells contains AMU .08 0 1 
spells ends in exit to work .57 .58 .53 
realized tm 170 (214) 153 (191) 372 (342) 
realized tp 158 (191) 153 (191) 210 (195) 
time spent in AMU 9 (47) 0 124 (120) 
time spent in other programs 38 (111) 38 (112) 46 (105) 
Note: The unit of interval is one spell. Standard deviations in parentheses. The ob-
served labor market outcomes are reported in fractions and days. 
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4. The empirical analysis 
4.1. Parameters 
For the duration dependence functions and the bivariate unobserved 
heterogeneity distribution we take flexible specifications. We take 
both λu(t) and λp(t) to have a piecewise constant specification which 
means that the value of λi is constant within duration intervals. In 
most of the empirical analyses, we take 8 intervals for λu and 6 for λp. 
In both cases, the length of an interval is 56 days, except for the last 
intervals which are unbounded from the right. The parameter λij de-
notes the value of λi in the jth interval. As an example, λu1 > λu2 means 
that, everything else equal, the exit rate to work is higher during the 
first 56 days of the unemployment spell than for the period from 57 
to 112 days.  
We assume that both vu and vp can take on two possible values, 
such that four combinations are possible, each of which has an asso-
ciated probability. The possible values of the vi as well as the prob-
abilities are then estimated. The joint unobserved heterogeneity dis-
tribution thus adds 7 unknown parameters to the model. This specifi-
cation is popular, flexible, and computationally feasible (see Van den 
Berg, 2001, for an overview). In the Appendix, we examine the speci-
fication in some more detail.  
4.2. Estimation results 
The basic model 
We estimate the models using the method of Maximum Likelihood. 
We take the unit of time to be one day. The baseline set of parameter 
estimates is displayed in Table 2. These are obtained by estimating the 
model under the following assumptions: δ is a constant, the lengths of 
the time intervals spent in AMU and in other programs are set to 
zero, and any subsequent participation in AMU after the first course 
within a spell is ignored. We include data on as many as three unem-
ployment spells per individual, if available.  
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Table 2. Estimation results for the baseline model 
 To work, θu To AMU  
training, θp 
AMU effect     
δ .83 (.10) *   
Individual characteristics     
log(age) -.59 (.11) * .35 (.29) 
short senior high school -.01 (.06) .20 (.16) 
senior high school -.10 (.07) .05 (.18) 
short tertiary education .08 (.12) -.13 (.29) 
university .23 (.09) * -.14 (.22) 
female .01 (.06) -.04 (.14) 
UI recipient .26 (.07) * .04 (.18) 
cash allowance recipient .21 (.10) * .43 (.23) * 
from Eastern Europe -.58 (.13) * .35 (.25) 
from Africa or Asia  -.85 (.14) * .18 (.28) 
log(hourly wage) .00 (.03) .16 (.09) 
experience in occupation (dummy) .17 (.05) * .12 (.14) 
education in occupation (dummy) .23 (.05) * .12 (.13) 
professional and technical work -.16 (.09) * .08 (.22) 
health, nursing and social work -.08 (.08) -.29 (.24) 
adm., managerial and clerical work -.39 (.09) * .34 (.22) * 
sales -.29 (.09) * .03 (.22) 
agriculture and mining .08 (.09) .09 (.23) 
services (incl. non categorized occ.) -.17 (.09) * -.06 (.19) 
large city (dummy) -.08 (.05) -.31 (.12) * 
needs guidance (dummy) -.48 (.11) * .54 (.20) * 
willing to move (dummy) .04 (.06) .18 (.16) 
accepts part time work (dummy) .11 (.09) -.46 (.32) 
1994 .24 (.07) * -.07 (.18) 
1995 .20 (.07) * -.04 (.17) 
1996 .24 (.08) * -.48 (.22) * 
1997 .53 (.08) * -.44 (.22) * 
1998 .58 (.08) * -.37 (.22) * 
1999 .75 (.09) * -1.07 (.22) * 
2000 .75 (.15) * -.69 (.68) 
 
THE EFFECT OF VOCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT TRAINING,  
Katarina Richardson and Gerard J. van den Berg 
201 
Table 2. Continued…. 
 To work, θu To AMU  
training, θp 
Duration dependence     
λi2 .11 (.05) * -.32 (.15) * 
λi3 .05 (.06) -.34 (.17) * 
λi4 .10 (.08) -.18 (.18) 
λi5 .04 (.09) .05 (.18) 
λi6 -.17 (.12) -5.00 (.19) * 
λi7 -.13 (.13)   
λi8 -.19 (.11) *   
Unobserved heterogeneity     
log (v1) -5.82 (.11)   
log (v2) -7.41 (.16)   
log (v3)   -8.02 (.68) 
log (v4)   -7.00 (.60) 
q13 -1.00 (1.19) 
q14 .94 (2.64) 
q23 1.32 (3.81) 
log likelihood value -22068.5 
Number of individuals 5010 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The superindex * denotes the significance at 
the 5 percent level (only for elements in βi and λi (with i = u, p) and δ). 
 
For the categorical variables in x we have the following baseline 
categories: education = less than short senior high school, gender = 
male, unemployment benefits type = none, nationality = not Eastern 
European, African or Asian, and type of occupation = manufacturing. 
Log age and log hourly wage in the previous employment are meas-
ured as the deviation from their mean across the 8656 spells. The 
“constant terms” in θu and θp are represented by the means of vu and 
vp, respectively, which is why we normalize λu1 = λp1 = 0 and x does 
not include a constant.  
The main parameter of interest is δ, which represents the effect of 
training on the transition rate to work. The estimated value of δ is 
0.83 and is significantly different from 0. Training thus raises this 
transition rate  by slightly more than 100 percent, which means that it 
more than doubles. The effect on the mean or median unemployment 
duration depends on the moment when training occurs. If the training 
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is given within the first month, the mean duration is more or less re-
duced by half. Similarly, training at a relatively early stage in an unem-
ployment spell has a large effect on the probability of long-term un-
employment. (Naturally, such a policy can be costly if implemented 
on a wide scale.) Recall that (part of) the effect may be due to in-
creased search effort on behalf of the caseworker, especially when the 
individual’s period of AMU participation comes to an end.  
Now, let us turn to the covariate effects on the transition rate to 
work. Not surprisingly, this rate is lower for older and non-Swedish 
individuals and it is higher for individuals with two years of high 
school and university graduates. It is also higher for UI recipients, 
thereby reflecting the stronger labor market attachment of these indi-
viduals. The disincentive effect of high UI benefits seems to be cap-
tured by the negative effect of a high previous wage on the exit rate to 
work, although this is insignificant. The interpretation of the effects 
of the calendar year is complicated by the fact that some vocational 
courses have been recorded as non-vocational courses during the time 
span of the data (Zettermark et al., 2000).  
The estimated duration dependence of θu is such that the individ-
ual transition rate to work decreases as the duration increases. Appar-
ently, stigmatization and discouraged worker effects play a significant 
role here. Further, some individuals may enter a loop of successive 
periods of unemployment and workfare.  
Most observed individual characteristics have an insignificant ef-
fect on the rate θp at which the individual enters AMU training. If the 
individual receives cash allowance, this rate is higher which may be 
due to the bad financial circumstances of such individuals. The rate at 
which individuals enter AMU fluctuates somewhat during the first 
300 working days of unemployment. Then, it becomes dramatically 
lower. Recall that UI recipients need to participate in some active la-
bor market program after 300 working days of unemployment in or-
der to extend their benefits entitlement, and that they do not use the 
AMU program for this purpose.  
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Table 3. Estimation results for the training effect on the transi-
tion rate to work when imposing the absence of unobserved 
heterogeneity 
 To work, θu 
AMU effect   
δ .57 (.05) * 
Individual characteristics   
log(age) -.50 (.07) * 
short senior high school .19 (.04) * 
senior high school .10 (.05) * 
short tertiary education .18 (.07) * 
university .38 (.05) * 
female .08 (.04) * 
UI recipient .65 (.05) * 
cash allowance recipient .61 (.07) * 
from Eastern Europe -.15 (.09) * 
from Africa or Asia  -.39 (.09) * 
log(hourly wage) .08 (.02) * 
experience in occupation (dummy) .44 (.04) * 
education in occupation (dummy) .35 (.04) * 
professional and technical work .10 (.06) * 
health, nursing and social work .25 (.06) * 
adm., managerial and clerical work -.18 (.06) * 
sales -.01 (.06) 
agriculture and mining .22 (.06) * 
services (incl. non categorized occ.) .19 (.05) * 
large city (dummy) .04 (.03) 
needs guidance (dummy) -.20 (.07) * 
willing to move (dummy) .13 (.04) * 
accepts part time work (dummy) .23 (.06) * 
1994 .52 (.05) * 
1995 .47 (.05) * 
1996 .51 (.06) * 
1997 .70 (.06) * 
1998 .71 (.06) * 
1999 .91 (.06) * 
2000 .96 (.10) * 
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Table 3. Continued…. 
 To work, θu 
Duration dependence   
λi1 -7.46 (.05) * 
λi2 -7.42 (.06) * 
λi3 -7.56 (.06) * 
λi4 -7.58 (.07) * 
λi5 -7.72 (.07) * 
λi6 -8.00 (.09) * 
λi7 -8.02 (.10) * 
λi8 -7.99 (.11) * 
log likelihood value -17413.1 
Number of individuals 5010 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The superindex * denotes the significance at 
the 5 percent level (only for elements in βi and λi (with i = u, p) and δ). 
 
As a first informal check on the robustness of the estimates, we 
compare them to those obtained from the misspecified model where 
it is imposed that there is no unobserved heterogeneity. In that case, 
the parameters of θu can be estimated in isolation from those in θp. 
The results are shown in Table 3. The constant term in θu is now rep-
resented by λu1, so that the estimates of the other λui are now lower 
than in Table 2, with an order of magnitude equal to the estimated λu1.  
There are no spectacular differences between the estimates of the 
θu parameters in Tables 2 and 3. Typically, when unobserved hetero-
geneity is ignored in the duration analysis, the estimated duration de-
pendence is more negative (i.e. θu decreases more over time), and the 
estimated covariate effects are smaller (see e.g. Lancaster, 1990; and 
Van den Berg, 2001).  
 Heterogeneous treatment effects on the individual transition rate to work 
So far in this subsection, we have assumed homogeneity of the treat-
ment effect δ on the exit rate to work over individuals and time. 
(Naturally, the treatment effect on other outcomes of interest, like the 
mean duration or the fraction employed within a year is heterogene-
ous, due to the nonlinear way in which they depend on δ and x,vu,vp.) 
We now allow for heterogeneous treatment effects. First, we allow δ 
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to be a non-constant function of the time t−tp that has elapsed since 
AMU participation. As we have seen in Subsection 1.2, there are rea-
sons for suspecting that the effect is smaller if this time elapsed is 
long. Further, the data show that many individuals move to employ-
ment the day they leave training.  
To capture this, we take δ to be a piecewise constant function of 
t−tp. Specifically, δ = δ1 if 0 ≤ t−tp ≤ 28 days, and δ = δ2 if t−tp > 28 
days. Alternatively, the model could be extended by incorporating real 
time spent in training and allowing for a time-dependent transition 
rate from training directly to employment. We return to this below.  
Table 4 gives the estimates for δ1 and δ2. Clearly, the training effect 
is very large right after the training participation period. The individ-
ual  is three times as likely to move to employment within a month 
after AMU training, as compared to if he had not participated in the 
training. After the first month, the effect is still positive, but it is 
much smaller.  
Table 4. Estimation results for the training effect on the transi-
tion rate to work when this is allowed to depend on the time 
elapsed since training 
 To work, θu 
AMU effect   
δ1 (i.e. ≤ 28 days)  1.24 (.13) * 
δ2 (i.e. > 28 days) .29 (.13) * 
log likelihood value -22057.8 
Number of individuals 5010 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The superindex * denotes the significance at 
the 5 percent level. 
 
For the sake of brevity, we do not report the other parameter es-
timates for this extended model. The estimates of the covariate effects 
βu and βp and their standard errors are the same as in Table 2. This is 
also true for the estimates of the duration dependence, λp. The esti-
mated duration dependence λu is slightly less negative, which is not 
surprising given that δ(t−tp) has now also become a source of negative 
duration dependence. There is also a slight change in the estimates of 
the unobserved heterogeneity distribution.  
The value of the test statistic of the likelihood ratio test of δ1 = δ2 
equals 21.4 (see the log likelihood values reported in Tables 2 and 4). 
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As this statistic has a chi-square distribution with one degree of free-
dom under the null hypothesis, we conclude that this null hypothesis 
is rejected. The training effect on the exit rate to work is mostly short-
run. Incidentally, note that this supports our assumption that training 
effects do not cross over to subsequent spells.  
The results on δ1 and δ2 may indicate that the job search effort by 
the caseworker is an important ingredient of the treatment. An alter-
native explanation is that trained workers who do not find a job 
within one month after finishing training become stigmatized, so that 
their chances of finding a job decrease. Yet another explanation is 
that the individual treatment effects are heterogeneous across indi-
viduals, so that the decreasing shape of δ(t−tp) reflects dynamic sort-
ing. The individuals who benefit a great deal from the course find a 
job quickly, and those who do not benefit remain unemployed longer. 
The heterogeneity may be due to heterogeneity of individual charac-
teristics or heterogeneity of the characteristics of the training course. 
The results suggest that human capital accumulation in itself is not a 
good explanation for the training effect. After all, it is unlikely that the 
human capital acquired in AMU becomes obsolete within one month.  
To proceed, we examine individual heterogeneity in the treatment 
effect. Individuals with a certain level of education, or a particular 
gender or nationality, may not be able to benefit as much from train-
ing as other individuals. For example, individuals with a high level of 
education may not benefit simply because not many courses are avail-
able at an academic level. We investigate this by allowing δ to depend 
on the level of education, gender and nationality. Specifically, δ is al-
lowed to have a different value if the individual has a short tertiary or 
university education.  
The main results are presented in Table 5. As expected, the esti-
mated training effect is smaller for those with a high level of educa-
tion. It is significantly different from zero. The estimated effects for 
women and immigrants are not significantly different from zero. 
Once more, we do not report the other parameter estimates for this 
extended model, because they are the same as in Table 2 (even the βu 
effects of level of education). The likelihood ratio test statistic of the 
null hypothesis that δ does not depend on the explanatory variables 
has the value of 6.4. Under the null hypothesis, this test statistic has a 
chi-square distribution with three degrees of freedom, which leads to 
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the acceptance of this null hypothesis at the 5 percent (though not at 
the 10 percent) level.  
Table 5. Estimation results for the training effect on the transi-
tion rate to work when this is allowed to depend on gender, 
educational level and nationality  
 To work, θu 
AMU effect   
main effect .94 (.13) * 
i.e. woman -.00 (.15) 
i.e. high education -.40 (.20) * 
Immigrant from Africa, Asia or Eastern 
Europe 
.11 (.26) 
log likelihood value -22065.3 
Number of individuals 5010 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The superindex * denotes the significance at 
the 5 percent level. 
 
Time in training and in other programs 
We now replace the rule that the length of the time intervals spent 
within AMU and other programs are set to zero by the rule that the 
timing keeps running during such periods. For Tu, this is more appro-
priate if individuals move into employment at the same rate within 
such periods as when they are “openly” unemployed. For Tp, this is 
more appropriate if individuals move into AMU at the same rate 
when they are in other programs as when they are “openly” unem-
ployed. We also let the treatment effect work from the moment the 
individual enters AMU. We use the symbol ∆ to denote the treatment 
effect parameter in the exit rate to work, and we assume that this pa-
rameter is constant over time. Somewhat loosely, ∆ captures the aver-
age of the effect during and the effect after participation, where the 
latter was captured by parameter δ the basic model. Since exit to work 
during the first months in AMU is very rare, we expect the estimate 
of ∆ to be smaller than the estimate of δ . 
The parameter estimates are reported in Table 6. Most are similar 
to those in Table 2. The estimate of the parameter of interest, ∆, is 
virtually equal to zero, however, and it is a compromise between the 
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very low transition rate from AMU to work in the first months and 
the very high transition rate from AMU to work after that.  
Table 6. Estimation results for the training effect on the transi-
tion rate to work when real time in programs is included and 
the training effect works from the moment of entering (instead 
of leaving) AMU  
 To work,θu To AMU training, θp 
AMU effect     
∆ .11 (.11)   
Individual characteristics     
log(age) -.71 (.11) * .59 (.30) * 
short senior high school .04 (.06) .18 (.16) 
senior high school -.08 (.07) .04 (.18) 
short tertiary education .11 (.12) -.12 (.30) 
university .22 (.09) * -.14 (.22) 
female .03 (.06) -.06 (.14) 
UI recipient .22 (.07) * .02 (.19) 
cash allowance recipient .21 (.11) * .34 (.23) 
from Eastern Europe -.75 (.15) * .39 (.26) 
from Africa or Asia  -.95 (.15) * .19 (.30) 
log(hourly wage) -.01 (.04) .17 (.09) 
experience in occupation (dummy) .20 (.06) * .08 (.14) 
education in occupation (dummy) .22 (.05) * .10 (.14) 
professional and technical work -.11 (.09) .03 (.22) 
health, nursing and social work .07 (.09) -.34 (.25) 
adm., managerial and clerical work -.38 (.09) * .32 (.23) 
sales -.26 (.09) * .01 (.22) 
agriculture and mining -.06 (.10) .09 (.24) 
services (incl. non categorized occ.) -.17 (.08) * -.09 (.20) 
large city (dummy) -.07 (.05) -.26 (.12) * 
needs guidance (dummy) -.54 (.11) * .51 (.20) * 
willing to move (dummy) .02 (.07) .18 (.16) 
accepts part time work (dummy) .16 (.10) * -.46 (.33) 
1994 .22 (.07) * -.15 (.18) 
1995 .17 (.07) * -.17 (.18) 
1996 .21 (.08) * -.63 (.22) * 
1997 .46 (.08) * -.63 (.22) * 
1998 .52 (.08) * -.59 (.22) * 
1999 .81 (.09) * -1.39 (.33) * 
2000 .84 (.16) * -1.03 (.69) * 
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Table 6. Continued….  
 To work,θu To AMU training, θp 
Duration dependence     
λi2 .08 (.05) -.62 (.15) * 
λi3 -.05 (.07) -.72 (.17) * 
λi4 .03 (.08) -.70 (.19) * 
λi5 .11 (.09) -.61 (.20) * 
λi6 -.11 (.11) -5.52 (.19) * 
λi7 -.06 (.12)   
λi8 -.19 (.09) *   
Unobserved heterogeneity     
log (v1) -5.74 (.12)   
log (v2) -7.09 (.14)   
log (v3)   -8.50 (.97) 
log (v4)   -6.76 (.40) 
q13 -.01 (.50) 
q14 2.20 (2.06) 
q23 3.63 (11.81) 
log likelihood value -22781.8 
Number of individuals 5010 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The superindex * denotes the significance at 
the 5 percent level (only for elements in βi and λi (with i = u, p) and ∆). 
 
In this extension, Tu is real time spent out of work (i.e. in unem-
ployment and in training programs and  other active labor market 
programs) since the entry into unemployment. The treatment effect ∆ 
also summarizes the effect of entering AMU on the total period of 
unemployment. We conclude that the net effect on the individual’s 
time spent out of work is about zero. Thus, from this point of view, 
the program does not appear to be cost-effective.  
We now turn to the other estimates. The duration dependence of 
the inflow rate into AMU is more negative than before which reflects 
the fact that individuals rarely move from other programs directly into 
AMU. The fact that the βi parameter estimates remain unchanged 
means that they are insensitive to whether we include time spent in 
other programs. Naturally, other programs may have their own causal 
effect on θu, but an analysis of this raises new selection problems and 
would be beyond the scope of this paper.  
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5. Conclusions 
After participation in an AMU vocational training course, the individ-
ual’s transition rate from unemployment to employment is signifi-
cantly and substantially higher than it would have been if he had not 
participated. This effect is largest during the first few weeks after exit-
ing the course. However, when we take the time spent within the pro-
gram into account, the net effect on the individual’s unemployment 
duration is about zero. Thus, from this point of view, the program 
does not appear to be cost-effective.  
The results are consistent with the view that AMU vocational 
training shifts (part of) the burden of skill improvement, screening 
effort and search effort from employers to the state. We find that this 
does not primarily affect the unemployed individuals’ time out of 
work. It is an open question whether this policy repairs market fail-
ures or reduces the variation in individual outcomes on an aggregate 
level, and whether this would makes the policy socially effective. A 
comprehensive cost-benefits analysis must take the effects on post-
unemployment wages and the duration of subsequent employment 
into account, but the available evidence suggests these effects to be 
insignificant (see earlier references and Korpi, 1994).  
There are some topics for further research. First, it would be inter-
esting to shed more light on why the effect on the individual transi-
tion rate to work is mainly short-run. It may reflect an additional 
search effort during the course or a stigmatization of workers who do 
not find a job within one month after finishing training. Alternatively, 
individual treatment effects are heterogeneous, which may be due to 
heterogeneity of individual characteristics or heterogeneity of the 
characteristics of the training course. In future work, we aim at distin-
guishing between these explanations by exploiting additional data in-
formation and estimating richer models.  
Second, in reality, participation in other programs may be affected 
by unobserved determinants related to the unobserved determinants 
of entry into AMU training and exit to work. In addition, one cannot 
typically participate in multiple programs at the same time. As a result, 
individuals who do not enter AMU training may flow into other pro-
grams at a relatively high rate. If participation in the latter programs 
has a positive effect on exit to work, our results under-estimate the 
effect of AMU training. The analysis should then include participation 
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in other programs, which would naturally increase the complexity of 
the model and the burden of estimation.  
References 
Abbring, J.H. and van den Berg, G.J. (2000), The nonparametric identification of 
treatment effects in duration models, Working Paper, Free University Am-
sterdam, Amsterdam. 
Abbring, J.H., van den Berg, G.J. and van Ours, J.C. (1997), The effect of unem-
ployment insurance sanctions on the transition rate from unemployment to 
employment, Working Paper, Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam. 
AMS (1997), Employment training, Working Paper, AMS, Solna. 
AMS (1998), Labour market policy programmes, Working Paper, AMS, Solna. 
AMS (2001) Arbetsmarknadspolitiska program, Årsrapport 2000, Prora 2001:2, 
National Labour Market Board. 
Björklund, A. (1993), The Swedish experience, in Measuring Labour Market Meas-
ures, Ministry of Labour, Denmark, Copenhagen. 
Bonnal, L., Fougère, D. and Sérandon, A. (1997), Evaluating the impact of French 
employment policies on individual labour market histories, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 64, 683-713. 
Brännäs, K. (2000), Estimation in a duration model for evaluating educational pro-
grams, Working paper, Umeå University, Umeå. 
Carling, K. and Richardson, K. (2001), The relative efficiency of labor market pro-
grams: Swedish experience from the 1990s, IFAU Working Paper 2001:2, 
Uppsala. 
Carling, K., Holmlund, B. and Vejsiu, A. (2001), Do benefit cuts boost job finding? 
Swedish evidence from the 1990s, Economic Journal 111, 766-790. 
Carling, K., Edin, P.A., Harkman, A. and Holmlund, B. (1996), Unemployment 
duration, unemployment benefits and labor market programs in Sweden, 
Journal of Public Economics 59, 313-334. 
Dahlberg, M. and Forslund, A. (1999), Direct displacement effects of labour market 
programmes: The case of Sweden, IFAU Working Paper 1999:7, Uppsala. 
Eberwein, C., Ham, J.C. and LaLonde, R.J. (1997), The impact of being offered and 
receiving classroom training on the employment histories of disadvantaged 
women: Evidence from experimental data, Review of Economic Studies 64, 
655-682. 
Edin, P.A. and Holmlund, B. (1991), Unemployment, vacancies and labour market 
programmes: Swedish evidence, in F. Padoa Schioppa (ed.), Mismatch and 
Labour Mobility, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
THE EFFECT OF VOCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT TRAINING,  
Katarina Richardson and Gerard J. van den Berg 
212 
Edin, P.A., Harkman, A., Holmlund, B. and Söderberg, H. (1998), Escaping long-
term unemployment in Sweden, Mimeo, Department of Economics, Upp-
sala University, Uppsala. 
Eriksson, M. (1997a), Comparison of compensatory and non-compensatory models 
for selection into labour market training, Umeå Economic Studies 437, 
Umeå University, Umeå. 
Eriksson, M. (1997b), Placement of unemployed into labour market programs: A 
quasi-experimental study, Umeå Economic Studies 439, Umeå University, 
Umeå. 
Fay, R.G. (1996), Enhancing the effectiveness of active labour market policies: Evi-
dence from programme evaluations in OECD countries, Working paper, 
OECD, Paris. 
Gritz, R.M. (1993), The impact of training on the frequency and duration of em-
ployment, Journal of Econometrics 57, 21-51. 
Harkman, A. and Johansson, A. (1999), Training or subsidized jobs—what works?, 
Working Paper, AMS, Solna. 
Korpi, T. (1994), Escaping unemployment, Working Paper, SOFI, Stockholm. 
Lancaster, T. (1990), The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Larsson, L. (2000), Evaluation of Swedish youth labour market programmes, IFAU 
Working Paper 2000:1, Uppsala. 
Regnér, H. (1997), Training at the job and training for a new job: Two Swedish 
studies, Dissertation series 29, Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stock-
holm University.  
Regnér, H. (2002), A nonexperimental evaluation of training programs for the un-
employed in Sweden, Labour Economics, forthcoming. 
Ridder, G. (1990), The non-parametric identification of generalized accelerated 
failure-time models, Review of Economic Studies 57, 167-182. 
Van den Berg, G.J. (2001), Duration models: Specification, identification, and mul-
tiple durations, in J.J. Heckman and E. Leamer (eds.), Handbook of 
Econometrics, Volume V, North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
Van den Berg, G.J., Holm, A. and van Ours, J.C. (2002), Do stepping-stone jobs 
exist? Early career paths in the medical profession, Journal of Population 
Economics, forthcoming. 
Zettermark, Å., Regnér, H., Aspgren, M. and Ericson, J. (2000), Efficient training 
programmes for the unemployed, Ministry of Industry, Ministry Publication 
Series 2000:38, Elanders Gotab, Stockholm (in Swedish, with an English 
summary). 
THE EFFECT OF VOCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT TRAINING,  
Katarina Richardson and Gerard J. van den Berg 
213 
Appendix 
We take the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms 
vu and vp to be bivariate discrete with two unrestricted mass point loca-
tions for each term. Let v1, v2, v3 and v4 denote the points of support of 
vu and vp, respectively (note that vu and vp are random variables whereas 
v1,..,v4 are realizations). The associated probabilities are denoted as pij : 
= Pr(vu = vi, vp = vj) with i = 1,2 and j = 3,4, and with p24 = 
1−p13−p14−p23. The covariance of vu and vp equals  
 
cov (vu,vp) = (p13p24−p14p23)·(v1−v2)·(v3−v4) 
 
It is easily shown that vu and vp are independent if and only if cov(vu,vp) 
= 0.  
In the estimation procedure, we actually estimate the transformed 
probabilities qij, implicitly defined as logistic versions of pi: 
 
pij = exp(qij) / Σ exp(qi*j*) 
 
Because pij sum to one, we normalize by taking q24 = 0. There is a 
one-to-one mapping between p13, p14 and p23 on [0,1] and q13, q14 and q23 
on (−∞,∞), so that estimating the qij instead of the pij has the advan-
tage that no boundary restrictions must be imposed on the parameter 
space. Moreover, conditional on v1 ≠ v2 and v3 ≠ v4, it holds that 
corr(vu,vp) = 0 if and only if q23 = q13−q14. 
 
  
 
